Online Texts: Gaunilo, On Behalf of the Fool
Gaunilo was a contemporary of St Anselm. Though a monk, he rejected Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence. He presented his rebuttal of Anselm’s argument in On Behalf of the Fool. The dialogue between the two of them can be followed into Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo.
Synopsis
In Chapter 1, Gaunilo reprises the ontological argument, following Chapter II of Anselm’s Proslogium.
In Chapter 2, he questions the connection between having something in one’s understanding and it existing in reality, noting that many non-existent things can exist in one’s understanding, and so claiming that God’s existence in the mind of the fool in no way implies his existence in reality.
Chapter 3 disputes the applicability of Anselm’s example of a painter first having what he is to paint in his understanding in his understanding and then bringing it into reality. The painter’s conception is a kind of self-knowledge, a knowledge of his creative intentions, and so, Gaunilo suggests, is not analogous to the conception of any external object in the world.
Gaunilo next, in Chapter 4, denies that God does exist in his understanding. Though he understands the word “God”, he says, he cannot conceive of him. God is unlike anything of which we have experience, and so is inconceivable; he does not exist in the understanding.
Chapter 5 then summarises Gaunilo’s objections to the argument thus far.
Chapter 6 takes up a different tack, introducing Gaunilo’s ontological argument for the perfect island. From this point, Gaunilo is not explaining what is wrong with the ontological argument, but instead consolidating his case that there is something wrong with it. He seeks to do this by showing that it is possible to construct arguments which have identical logical form to Anselm’s ontological argument, but which have absurd conclusions, e.g. that the island than which no greater island can be conceived must exist in reality as well as in the mind.
Chapter 7 continues in this vein, arguing that the ontological argument for the perfect island is just as defensible as the ontological argument for God.
Finally, Chapter 8 completes the work, almost apologetically, expressing great admiration for all parts of the Proslogium
except that part here criticised.